

Attachment 1

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TO: [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: General: Communist Party Penetration Program
Specific: Sabotage Training, Preparations and Activities of CPs

1. It is requested that increased attention be given to the subject of sabotage training and preparation by Communist elements of your area; that specific targets for Communist sabotage action be determined; that information pertaining to sabotage devices, equipment and materials planned for use by the Communists be procured; that efforts be made to ascertain whether Communist use of sabotage is planned for the immediate future or is planned only for a time just prior to the outbreak of general warfare between the East and West. It is also requested that Communist Party [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] be instructed to give particular attention to the subject of sabotage instruction, that is, whether this kind of instruction is given, identification of instructors and schools where sabotage is taught, types of Communists chosen for this training, targets, materials, etc.

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2. Concurrently it is desired that [REDACTED] remain alert to [REDACTED]

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3. The following summarization of recent reporting about Communist sabotage activity, evaluated as probably true, is presented as a working hypothesis which may serve as a basis for further investigation:

a. Schools in Iron Curtain countries are providing training in sabotage to Communists from non-Orbit countries. Soviet or satellite clandestine service personnel are probably in charge of the sabotage training given at these schools; the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) working with a satellite intelligence service probably provides the ultimate direction for all Communist Party sabotage operations.

Sabotage instruction given in certain schools in the satellites may be highly specialized, with training in some schools focused upon marine, aviation or industrial sabotage.

b. In general, wherever pertinent reporting has been submitted, Communist sabotage action is still in the preparatory and training stage, with those Communist Parties nearest the Soviet or satellite borders giving the most attention to this activity.

- c. In conducting industrial sabotage, Communist activists are warned to damage vital parts of machinery, but in such a manner that factory machinery is not permanently damaged and can be put into operation shortly after a revolution is achieved.
- d. Materials which will probably be used by a Communist Party for sabotage will be easily obtainable in the local area of operation, and will be inexpensive and effective in small amounts.
- e. Personnel to be used for sabotage will probably be thoroughly trained, veteran Party workers who have had previous experience in this work; they will probably work with young, inexperienced men who have been drawn from a Communist Party or from a Communist youth organization; the latter probably will have had some training in an Iron Curtain country.
- f. Isolated instances of sabotage committed by Communists in certain countries in recent years, have probably been the result of (a) excessive zeal on the part of individual Party members strongly affected by Communist propaganda, (b) an action taken by a Communist Party to impress left-wing, non-Communist Parties and their affiliates with Communist capabilities.
- g. Party lectures given in one area concerning the subject of sabotage reportedly have stressed the necessity for this type of action for the successful achievement of a Communist revolution and have pointed out the place that this type of activity had in the

Bolshevik revolution, thus preparing certain activists psychologically for this work. A Gallup-type poll was reportedly taken among Party members in one area to determine how "true Communists" would react to combat action, sabotage, etc.

h. The majority of cases of sabotage carried out by or contemplated by Communist Parties in the period 1952 to present, have been directed against transport vehicles or equipment.

4. An informal record of newspaper reports concerning fires and explosions which have occurred on ships of various nationalities during the past five years shows thirty such cases. In most cases the cause of the accident was never determined, and although in several cases sabotage was definitely suspected, in no case was Communist involvement proven.

5. On 7 March 1955, two West German Communists were killed in an apartment in Hamburg while preparing an explosive material, the elements of which were purchased locally. Large amounts of the basic ingredients, not affected by the explosion, were found stored in the apartment. Investigation of the premises also revealed the presence of photographic equipment and cryptographic materials.

Admissions made by the widow of one of the Communists indicate that both men had received training in East Berlin by unidentified Russians; that there had been at least one meeting with Ernst Wellweber, Secretary of

the East German State Secretariat for Security; that in addition to producing explosives, the two Communists spent time trying to improve their photographic and cryptographic skills; both men were to take a radio training course in East Germany later in 1955; that plans existed whereby one was to work in Bremen and the other in Cologne on a long-range basis. Although the specific targets for sabotage action were not determined, it is known that if the program for the production of explosives had been continued, using the quantity of materials stored, there would have been enough for hundreds of explosions.

6. The following statement made by a former Soviet intelligence officer who defected in 1954 indicates the ultimate control exercised by an agency of the Soviet government over sabotage action planned by a Communist Party:

"Communist Parties abroad would not normally be given sabotage missions. If a local Communist leader thought that an act of sabotage should be committed, he could state his reasons and make appropriate recommendations for approval of his plan by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Central Committee (CPSU) would probably not issue direct orders for this type of action, as it is generally reserved for the MVD, even to the exclusion of GRU. This would hold true especially in wartime."